COMMENT by unknown
COMMENT.
COMMENT.
In his recent article on "Some Constitutional Questions under the
Federal Anti-Trust Law," 7 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 289, Mr. Edward B.
Whitney doubts very much whether the Anti-Trust Law will be held
applicable where the contract in restraint of trade is merely ancillary
to a sale of lease of a business. Ebel v. Brett-a case recently decid-
ed by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, bears
out Mr. Whitney's conclusions and may be an indicator of the result
the United States Supreme Court will reach when it comes to decide
the same point. For Mr. Justice Peckham in his opinion in U. S. v.
Trans-Hissouri Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290 , 329, admits that "A
contract, which is the mere accompaniment of the sale of property.
and thus entered into for the purpose of enhancing the price at which
the vendor sells it, which, in effect, is collateral to such sale, and when
the main purpose of the whole contract is accomplished by such sale,
might not be included within the letter or spirit of the statute." In
Ebel v. Brett one ship broker sold to another all his interest and good
will in the business of freighting vessels for Port au Prince, agreeing
for a specified time not to solicit freights for that place and the Court
held that the Anti-Trust Law did not apply. From the joining of
the word "contract'with the words" combination" and "conspiracy"
in the Statute, it is clear that it was aimed at trusts and monopolies,
and contracts which are directly in restraint of trade. As Judge
Barrett says: "It certainly was not intended to prohibit a man from
selling his business in the ordinary way, and from thereupon obtain-
ing the full value thereof through the instrumentality of an incidental
covenant not to compete with the purchaser within some limited
area." U. S. v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, is another
recent case analogous but not deciding the same point.
In the attempts which are constantly being made to raise the
standard of physical health, and to so restrict the practice of medi-
cine as to best conduce to this end, an important advance has been
made in Hawker v. Peopble of tke State of New York, 12 U. S. Supreme
Court. Advance Sheets, 609, which arose under a statute making it a
misdemeanor for any one to attempt to practice medicine after a con-
viction of a felony. The plaintiff in error had been so convicted sev-
eral years before, and had served out his sentence thereunder. It
was here held that this statute was not an ex-postfacto law. increasing
the punishment, but simply a valid exercise of the police power;
under which the State could require moral qualifications for the prac.
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tice of medicine, and could make a conviction of felony conclusive
proof of a lack of such morals.
This case is a very good example of the disinclination of the
courts to restrict the exercise of the police power of a State, especially
when it is directed toward the preservation of the public health. As
the population increases, it is one of the most important and difficult
functions which the State must perform, and since the right to prac-
tice medicine is entirely dependent upon Jlegislative permission, the
State may require a good character ras a necessary qualification as
well as mere knowledge of the theory of medicine. If by so doing the
number of unworthy practitioners can be decreased the benefit accru-
ing to the public in general will be sufficient to more than offset the
injustice done by such a law in some cases.
